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Abstract 
We demonstrate an intuitive relation between conditional entropy and 
conditional expectation that is useful when one want to compare them 
as measurement tools to evaluate secrecy systems. In particular, we 
give a Security Property applicable to general vector variables in   , 
using measurement based on vector quadratic distance, and we show 
that one can derive variables that can be measured with Csiszàr and 
Körner secrecy capacity measurement [2], based on conditional 
entropy, with conserving the same order relation. 
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I. Introduction 
When considering communication systems in which three entities  ,   and   receive respectively a 
random variable  ,  , and  , it has been an important domain of research to determine under what 
conditions on the variables  ,  , and   the communication system is Information Theoretically secure, 
meaning that it enables the legitimate partners   and   to exchange data that remain hidden to the 
eavesdropping opponent  , even if   has unlimited computation and storage power. 
The first necessary achievement in order to obtain Information Theoretical Security is called 
Advantage Distillation. It can be intuitively understood as the fact that   and   obtain variables   and 
  that are ‘closer’ than say   and  , according to some distance over the sample space. 
Csiszàr and Körner have introduced in [2] a measurement, based on conditional entropy, that lower-
bounds secrecy capacity   , meaning the maximum rate at which   and   can exchange Information 
Theoretically secure bits. That lower-bound is: 
      
  
( ( | )   ( | )) 
On the other hand, entropy is not an easy function to manipulate in many contexts, and it appears more 
natural, typically in the Euclidean space   , to measure Advantage between the partners   and   over 
the opponent   by using the quadratic distance in  . 
This article gives an equivalence between a measurement of Advantage based on quadratic distance 
and the Csiszàr and Körner’s measurement of Advantage applied to a transformed version of the 
variables  ,  , and  . 
  
II. Presentation and proof of the general result 
We consider ‖ ‖ the quadratic distance over the Euclidean space   . For     : 
‖ ‖  ∑  
 
 
   
 
The technical result that we will demonstrate is the following: 
Lemma 1. 
For         , there exist (i) a set  , (ii) an independent random variable   taking values in 
 , (iii) a non trivial pre-condition    and (iv) a function  : 
    {   }, such that: 
‖   ‖  ‖   ‖   [ (   )  (   )|         ]   [ (   )  (   )|         ] 
Proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Annex 1. 
We thus apply the randomized transformation: 
    (   ) 
    (   ) 
    (   ) 
It has been shown by Wyner [3] that, for binary random variable          (typically being the 
received bit flows of       in a secrecy system), provided that  (     )    ⁄ : 
 (     )   (     )   (  |  )   (  |  ) 
Therefore, by noticing that  (     )   [     ], we can explicit that in the conditions above, 
we have the relation: 
 [‖   ‖ ]   [‖   ‖ ]   (  |  )   (  |  ) 
III. Interest of the result 
In a secrecy system, the passive eavesdropping opponent has access only to a set of public information 
 , and then the optimal estimation of   by an observer who only knows   is of course given by 
 [ | ] 
This variable minimizes 
    ( ) [‖   ( )‖
 ] 
It is therefore a consequence of the above relation that, if the observer   does not have access to the 
optimal estimation variable  [ | ] for any reason governed by the Security Model, then we may have: 
 [‖   ( )‖ ]   [‖   [ | ]‖ ]                                                   ( ) 
for any strategy  ( ) chosen by the opponent, and thus: 
  
 (  |  )   (  | ) 
An example of such Security Model where the observer   does not have access to the optimal 
estimation variable  [ | ] is Deep Random secrecy [5], in which it is shown that the absence of full 
knowledge of probability distribution of   by the opponent   may be exploited to ensure that the 
inequality ( ) is strict, thus enabling to obtain strictly positive Secrecy Capacity   . Note however that 
in a secrecy system, the legitimate partner   may neither have access to an estimation as accurate as 
the optimal estimation  [ | ], and therefore, when analyzing a secrecy system, the inequality ( ) is 
not alone a guarantee of security. 
In general, it is useful to be able to study Advantage Distillation with to a tool like quadratic distance, 
that benefits from solid mathematical framework, rather than directly conditional entropy. 
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Annex – Proof of Lemma 1 
 
  Let’s first establish the result for    : 
We denote  ( )  [ ]     , in which [ ]        {   } 
For     [   ⁄    ⁄ [ (which represents    and   ), and   [   [ we have: 
 [ (   )  (   )|   ]  |   | 
and thus the equivalence is immediate. 
The proof of the result for     is the following: 
Let’s assume that ‖ ‖    is a public condition   , then it is natural to impose as well    and   . We 
will denote by    the identity matrix of size  . For      , we consider the isometries: 
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For   (         )  [    [
   , we consider the functions: 
 ( )  ∏  (  )
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By recurrence, we get: 
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which implies that  (     ) is a surjection from [    [
    on the n-sphere      . 
Let’s define the equivalence relation   in [    [
   : 
    
    (   )   (    ) 
The equivalence classes are denoted   ( ( ) ). Each equivalence class    ( ( )  ) has exactly 
     elements. If    is an element of    ( ) , then: 
  
   (  )   
    (   )    (   )  (  ) 
    ((      )      )  
which implies that, not only for     but for any         we have: 
(i)  (   ) is a surjection from [    [    on the n-sphere       
(ii)             all classes   ( 
 ) contains also exactly      
 
 
By decomposing   canonically as shown above, we obtain that  ̃ is a bijection and courses uniformly 
the n-sphere       when (         ) courses uniformly [    [
     ⁄ . It implies that: 
 [ (   )  (   )|         ]   (‖   ‖) 
only depends on ‖   ‖. 
 
 
   
([( )    ]     ) corresponds to the mapping of a vector in the n-
dimensional checkboard where each unit hypercube ‘colored in white’ has immediate adjacent unit 
hypercube only ‘colored in black’. 
Then, it is clear that  ( )   , and  ( )    for    . It implies that   is locally increasing for 
   , if   is chosen sufficiently small.  
 
